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The nexus between renewable electricity (RES-E) generation and interconnection is likely to 
play a large part in future de-carbonised power systems. This paper examines whether RES-E 
shares should be measured based on consumption rather than production with a European 
case study presented for the year 2030. The case study demonstrates the volume and scale of 
RES-E transfers and shows how countries have differing RES-E shares when comparing 
those derived based on the traditional production-based approach to the alternative. The 
proposed consumption-based approach accounts for RES-E being imported and exported on 
an hourly basis across 30 European countries and highlights concerns regarding 
uncoordinated support mechanisms, price distortions and cost inequality. These concerns are 
caused by cross-border subsidisation of electricity and this work proposes that an agency be 
appointed to administer regional RES-E affairs. This agency would accurately quantify RES-
E shares and remunerate producers from the country that consumed their electricity instead of 
where it has been produced – policy would be enhanced by enabling more equitable and 
optimal electricity decarbonisation.  
Highlights 
 Consumption-based methodology to quantify RES-E is presented 
 Consumption-based approach accounts for impact of RES-E imports & exports 
 International agency could implement approach to address price distortions 
 Policy is enhanced by enabling more equitable and optimal electricity decarbonisation 
*Revised Manuscript





































































Globally, power sector portfolios are undergoing a technology transformation with the 
ambition of achieving long-term carbon-neutrality.  The Paris agreement of 2015, signed by 
195 countries, is a significant driver of technological change as a concerted effort is needed to 
limit greenhouse gas emissions in order to keep global temperatures ‘well below’ 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels (European Commission, 2015).  The European Union’s (EU) Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS) as well as various climate and energy packages are policy instruments 
that promote the decarbonisation of the energy system through incentivising emissions 
reduction, increasing energy efficiency and increased deployment of renewables.  Higher 
levels of variable renewable electricity (RES-E) can pose challenges for power system 
operation as they produce non-synchronous and non-dispatchable electricity (i.e. wind, solar, 
wave, tidal) (Schaber et al., 2012).  These challenges can be mitigated to a certain extend by 
interconnection to neighbouring systems (Booz & Co. et al., 2013; Denny et al., 2010).  
Furthermore, as renewable generation grows, there is an increasing likelihood that RES-E 
may be exported to neighbouring countries during periods of excess power.  While the 
authors are cognisant that ‘an electron is an electron’ no matter how it is generated, it is also 
recognised that RES-E targets in many regions do, in fact, differentiate between electrons – 
by source.  
EU Member States for example, must achieve renewable electricity targets based on “the 
quantity of electricity produced in a Member State from renewable energy sources” as a 
proportion of Gross Final Consumption (GFC),
1
 as stated in Article 5(3) of the Renewable 
Energy Directive (2009/28/EC) (European Commission, 2009a).  Applying a production-
based approach is sensible in an isolated, closed system where electricity production must 
equal consumption; meaning all renewable electricity is consumed domestically.  However, 
interconnector transfers and planned increases in capacity
2
 are playing an increasingly 
important role in today’s European power system, i.e. making it easier to share renewable 
                                                 
1
 The GFC of electricity is, for the purposes of RES-E calculations, defined as: “Gross electricity production 
from all energy sources (actual production, no normalisation for hydro and wind), excluding the production of 
electricity in pumped storage units from water that has previously been pumped uphill; plus total imports of 
electricity; minus total exports of electricity.” Eurostat, 2015. SHARES Tool Manual Version 2015.70124. 
Eurostat, European Commission. 
2
 Interconnection capacity targets for Member States are 10% and 15% of installed electricity production 
capacity by 2020 and 2030 respectively. European Commission, 2017. Renewables: Europe on track to reach its 




































































electricity surpluses and improving the operational control of a system.  Equally a patchwork 
of varying national support schemes for renewable generation has led to situations where 
renewables are built where support is the strongest, rather than where the most cost-effective.  
Consequently, transfers of renewable electricity across interconnectors can present situations 
where the costs of renewable electricity are subsidised in one country and consumed in 
another.  This therefore begs the question whether a consumption-based accounting approach 
to quantifying renewable electricity, which considers these transfers, should be used? 
The Renewable Energy Directive already acknowledges that it is appropriate to facilitate the 
consumption of energy in one Member State which has been produced from renewable 
sources in another in order to meet defined targets in a cost-efficient manner.  The directive 
proposes flexibility measures in the form of statistical transfer and joint projects between 
Member States to facilitate this.  However, Member States have so far not engaged in these 
schemes with just two exceptions: Sweden and Norway (non-EU Member State); and 
Denmark and Germany (International Energy Agency, 2016b).  Uncoordinated financial 
support schemes have the potential to cause price distortions between neighbouring countries 
which can lead to electricity transfers that do not provide societal gain and potentially cause 
cost inequalities as RES-E supported in one country is consumed in another, raising questions 
around ‘who pays the difference between the market price and support scheme strike price?’  
Viewing renewable generation from a consumption-based standpoint delivers a different 
perspective on the intricacies involved in electricity generation and transmission.  Identifying 
the movement of RES-E between countries opens ‘Pandora’s box’ in terms of accounting for 
RES-E shares, costs inequalities associated with transferred RES-E and potential price 
distortions but it also sheds light on whether the current production-based approach is ‘fit for 
purpose’ in a future de-carbonised electricity sector. 
In this paper, a consumption-based approach for quantifying a country’s RES-E share is 
proposed and implications for renewable support schemes are discussed.  The methodology is 
based on the concept of measuring the RES-E that is actually consumed within a country’s 
boundary rather than what is produced.  Accounting for interconnector inflows and outflows 
is a fundamental part of the methodology that provides the key difference between this and a 
traditional ‘production-based’ approach.  The proposed consumption-based approach is 
demonstrated using the European internal market for electricity (hereafter; EU Target Model) 




































































example, consumption-based measurement of renewables is used for the transport and 
heating & cooling sectors. 
Using PLEXOS® Integrated Energy Model, a European electricity model for 2030 is created 
based on the recent European Commission’s Reference Scenario (Capros et al., 2016).  Once 
simulated, the results are post-processed to determine the country
3
 where RES-E is produced 
and more importantly, where it is consumed, on an hourly basis.  In doing so, issues 
associated with mass RES-E transfer across Europe are captured, such as uncoordinated 
support schemes, price distortions and cross-border subsidisation.  These insights allow an in-
depth discussion on the challenges and the institutional structures that need to be addressed to 
achieve a low carbon power system. 
While many publications concentrate on topics such as the production-based versus 
consumption-based quantification question (Fan et al., 2016; Ji et al., 2016; Larsen and 
Hertwich, 2009; Peters, 2008; Shao et al., 2016; Simas et al., 2017; Wiedmann, 2009), the 
facilitation of RES-E in power systems (Cleary et al., 2016; Collins et al., 2017; Daly et al., 
2015; Deane et al., 2015; EirGrid & SONI, 2010, 2011; Fraunhofer IWES, 2015; Gaffney et 
al., 2017b; Henriot et al., 2013; McGarrigle et al., 2013) and/or the importance of border 
trade (Bahar and Sauvage, 2013; Booz & Co. et al., 2013; Denny et al., 2010; EirGrid & 
SONI, 2010; EURELECTRIC, 2016; Fraunhofer IWES, 2015; International Energy Agency, 
2016a) regarding their respective place in a future decarbonised electricity system, few 
publications focus on the quantification requirements when both RES-E integration and cross 
border trade are taken together.  Ji et al. (2016) highlight a concern surrounding electricity 
traded between power systems and the characteristics associated with the transfer.  Focusing 
on the greenhouse gas emissions aspect of traded electricity, Ji et al. (2016) outline a high-
level proposal to account for both direct and in-direct emissions that widens the boundary 
under consideration when addressing the concern.  
Building upon Ji et al.’s concept of ‘broadening the boundary under consideration,’ we 
present a test case that highlights: 1) the short-comings of a production-based approach in 
interconnected systems with high levels of renewables; 2) challenges and potential solutions 
for the European internal market in 2030; and 3) concerns over pecuniary externalities caused 
by cross-border subsidisation and uncoordinated support schemes which can lead to issues 
                                                 
3
 “Country” is preferred over “Member State” as not all countries in the model are part of the European Union, 




































































surrounding effects on investment signals and long-term security of electricity supply 
problems. 
The paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 outlines the methodological approach and 
assumptions used during the analytical phase of the paper.  Section 3 overviews the main 
results from the analysis, while Section 4 discusses various potential impacts associated with 
the proposal along with considerations related to its implementation.  Section 5 concludes the 
paper with some final remarks. 
In an effort to promote transparency, the PLEXOS® model and the excel tool used to 
calculate renewable electricity flows, along with all associated data have been made freely 
available online for academic research at: 
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/m6pik1iql3ddpuj/AABYdHHk4_43WpGoSFNx329Aa?dl=0  
2. Methodology 
The methodology applied combines a soft-linking approach between energy system and 
power system models, as described by Deane et al. (2012), with a post-processing phase to 
ascertain the volume of RES-E that is both produced and consumed in each country included 
in the analysis.  First, the European Commission’s Reference Scenario is soft-linked to a 
power system model comprising of 30 European countries (EU-28 Member States,
4
 Norway 
and Switzerland) focusing on the year 2030.  Post-processing is carried out on an hourly 
basis, in line with the EU Target Model day-ahead market scheduling algorithm known as 
EUPHEMIA.
5
  This analytical phase will address the phenomenon known as ‘wheeling’, 
where electricity may be traded through one country to access another, based on wholesale 
market price differentials.  Through analysis of the data it is possible to separate the share of 
interconnector flows subject to ‘wheeling’ compared to that derived directly from the country 
in question.  
                                                 
4
 At the time of writing, the United Kingdom remains a constituent of the European Union. 
5
 Acronym: ‘EU Pan-European Hybrid Electricity Market Integration Model.’ For more information on the 
EUPHEMIA algorithm, see the developer N-SIDE, EUPHEMIA, Brussels. or operator Price Coupling of 
Regions, 2016. EUPHEMIA: Description and Functioning, in: PCR (Ed.), EUPHEMIA Stakeholder Forum. 




































































2.1. Power system simulation 
PLEXOS® Integrated Energy Model (PLEXOS®) is a power system modelling platform 
used for power and gas market modelling (Drayton et al., 2004).  The software is a unit 
commitment and economic dispatch modelling tool that optimises at least cost the operation 
of the electricity system over the simulation period at high technical and temporal resolution 
whilst respecting operational constraints.  Version 7.4 (R02) of PLEXOS® was operated on a 
Dell Inspiron CN55905 laptop with a 6
th
 Generation Intel® Core i7-6500U Processor.  The 
MOSEK solver was used to simulate the model with Rounded Relaxation unit commitment 
applying a 0.01% relative gap and 6-hour look-ahead.  Using hourly dispatch, in line with the 
EU Target Model day-ahead market scheduling platform, 365 days were simulated to 
replicate 2030, taking 1.5 hours to complete.  
2.1.1. Scenario description 
The installed power generation capacities for the EU-28 Member States were outlined in the 
European Commission’s Reference Scenario by generation class, for example; Hydro, Oil, 
Gas, Solids, Biomass/Waste, et cetera.  The portfolios were disaggregated into individual 
power plant types by fuel class and assigned standard technical characteristics as shown in 
Table 1 and Table 2 an approach used previously by Deane et al. (2015).  Assumptions based 
on ENTSO-E (2015) Ten Year Network Development Plan – Vision 1
6
  publication were 
used to represent the Swiss and Norwegian power systems. 
The model is simulated as a closed loop comprising of 30 European countries and 58 
interconnectors and overall regional generation must meet regional load in each hour 
simulated.  Therefore, when all hourly interconnector flows (exports and imports) are 
summed, the result (net of interconnector transfer losses) must be zero, as shown in Eq. (1). 
        
  
     (1) 
where i represents interconnectors and IC is the flow of electricity on an interconnector. IC 
flow is positive for exports and negative for imports.  
 
[INSERT Table 1] 
[INSERT Table 2] 
                                                 
6
 Vision 1 was chosen over the other scenarios represented as it was the most conservative 2030 option and, 





































































Demand profiles:  Hourly resolution demand curves were attained from historic ENTSO-E 
data (ENTSO-E, 2012) and linearly scaled to the overall demand estimates outlined in the 
European Commission’s Reference Scenario. 
Wind, solar and hydro profiles: Hourly generation profiles for wind power were sourced 
from Gonzalez-Aparicio et al. (2016).  Solar profiles were created from NREL’s PVWatts® 
calculator which estimated the solar radiance from assumptions around system location and 
basic system design parameters for each country (Dobos, 2013).  Hydro profiles are 
decomposed from monthly generation constraints provided by ENTSO-E (2012) to weekly 
and hourly profiles in the optimisation algorithm function in PLEXOS®. 
Pumped hydro energy storage is not simulated in this model for the reason being that it 
increases simulation time significantly but more importantly because under Article 5(3) of the 
Renewable Energy Directive “renewable energy sources shall be calculated as the quantity 
of electricity produced in a Member State from renewable energy sources, excluding the 
production of electricity in pumped storage units from water that has previously been 
pumped uphill.” (European Commission, 2009a, p.29). 
Interconnection: The interconnection capacities between countries represented in the model 
are based on projections from the ENTSO-E (2015) ‘Ten Year Network Development Plan 
2016’ publication, see Figure 1.
7
  Interconnection is limited to net transfers between countries 
and excludes interregional transfers in line with the EU day-ahead market schedule dispatch 
clearing algorithm, EUPHEMIA.  
 
[INSERT Figure 1] 
 
2.2. Post-processing 
Post-processing is required to identify the RES-E flow across Europe’s interconnectors for 
each hour of a given year.  Due to the complexity associated with tracing wheeled exports to 
their source(s), this approach employs an iterative process to continually improve calculation 
accuracy until all RES-E transfer is accounted for.  The foundation of this approach lies with 
                                                 
7




































































the identification of the true source(s) of wheeled exports in each hour.  Once known, the 
exported electricity is checked for any RES-E content.  While in most cases no RES-E exist, 
when it does however, it is possible to trace the energy to its point of consumption purely 
based on the economic dispatch of generation portfolios and the merit-order approach (Sáenz 
de Miera et al., 2008; Sensfuß et al., 2008). 
This approach functions on the assumption that all country-specific electricity markets within 
the model employ an economic dispatch approach, therefore RES-E is consumed locally to 
meet domestic load before any renewable exports can occur.  This is supported by the 
requirement under Article 16 of Renewable Energy Directive for transmission system 
operators to comply with their duty to minimise curtailment of renewable electricity and 
based on the knowledge that a high share of EU RES-E generation receive power purchase 
agreements through government backed support schemes, as demonstrated by RES Legal 
(2017).  Therefore RES-E can bid in low, zero or negative bid prices to the energy market to 
reduce dispatch exposure.
8
  Furthermore, when RES-E flow has been identified as travelling 
between countries the same principal is used in the importing country in terms of economic 
dispatch.  In other words, RES-E is only exported if the combined domestic RES-E and 
imported RES-E (if applicable) exceeds domestic load. 
2.2.1. Components of interconnector flow 
In this methodological approach, electricity transferred via interconnection is considered a 
combination of two components.  The electricity is either a direct product of the country 
where the interconnector originates or an indirect product which is derived from another 
location and passes through one country to another, also referred to as ‘wheeling electricity’.  
Henceforth the first is referred to as “Domestic Exports,” the second “Wheeled Exports.”  
Domestic Exports (DE) occur when domestic generation exceeds domestic load, causing an 
export of electricity directly associated with the country in question.  Wheeled Exports (WE) 
are equal to interconnector flow net of Domestic Exports, see Eq. (2). 
              
  
     (2) 
where, 
                                                 
8
 RES-E generation has the advantage of priority dispatch under the Renewable Energy Directive (2009/28/EC). 
This may not be in the case in 2030 as outlined in the draft directive on the Internal Electricity Market. 
European Commission, 2016b. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 




































































 DE = Domestic Generation – Domestic Load 
 WE = Interconnector Flow – Domestic Exports (if Domestic Exports >0) 
else, 
 WE = Interconnector Flow 
where i represents interconnectors. 
2.2.2. Calculating the RES-E share of interconnector flows 
To measure the RES-E share of Wheeled Exports across an interconnector, the true source of 
the electricity must first be determined by tracing interconnection flows back to their origin. 
In doing so, what is actually identified as the source of Wheeled Exports is the Domestic 
Exports of a country that is not importing electricity.  Therefore, to identify the source(s) of 
wheeled electricity in a given hour a country must export electricity and not import, as shown 
in Eq. (3).  The RES-E share of electricity transfer is then assessed and if applicable, 
quantified using Eq. (4). Eq. (4) states that RES-E generation must first exceed domestic load 
for any renewable export to occur.  If RES-E export occurs, it is demonstrated as a share of 
domestic exports as shown in Eq. (4).  Finally, the results are tabulated to determine the RES-
E volume imported into each country in a given hour, thereby concluding Step 1 in what is an 
iterative process to ascertain the RES-E share of all interconnector flows.  
             
 
    > 0 &        
 
    = 0  (3) 
         
                  
    
 
  
   
  (4) 
where, 
 RES-E Generation - Domestic Load > 0 
where j represents the country and n is the maximum number of interconnections.  Exp and 
Imp represents electricity exports and imports respectively from a country.  RES_% is the 
renewable share of exports. 
Figure 2 and the following explanation describes how each step in the post-processing phase 
relates to the next in terms of accounting for RES-E transfer across interconnector capacity.  




































































requirements outlined in Eq. (3) and Eq. (4).  In other words, Country A is the source of 
wheeled RES-E exports. As such, interconnector flow between countries ‘A – B’ and ‘A – S’ 
are represented by green unbroken lines to signify RES-E flow in a given hour.  The main 
objective of Step 1 is to identify the sources of wheeled exports in each hour and assess if 
renewable energy is present.  The following steps use this information as a foundation to 
trace the RES-E flows to their final location through multiple iterations. 
 
[INSERT Figure 2] 
 
Step 2 sums the imported RES-E, as identified in the previous step, and the domestic RES-E 
to determine if renewable exports occur in a given hour.  This calculation must abide by the 
condition that RES-E generation fulfils domestic load before renewable exports are possible.  
From Step 2, the information is again tabulated to identify the RES-E volume imported into 
each country in a given hour. 
To best illustrate Step 2 using Figure 2, the focus is on the transfer between countries ‘B – C’ 
and ‘S – B’.  The figure shows the interconnection between ‘B – C’ in this step as a red 
broken line to indicate that no RES-E flow, therefore the combination of imported and 
domestic RES-E does not exceed domestic load in Country B. However, the RES-E flow 
between ‘B – C’ has not yet fully accounted for all RES-E flow up-stream.  In Step 1, the 
interconnector from ‘S – B’ had no RES-E flow as imports from Country A were not yet 
accounted for in Country S.  In Step 2, this RES-E flow is accounted for and the 
interconnection between S – B is green – meaning the combination of imported and domestic 
RES-E exceeds domestic load and RES-E is exported.  However, the interconnector ‘B – C’ 
has not yet taken account of this additional RES-E flow wheeled through Country S.  This 
imprecision is corrected in Step 3 when the RES-E flow becomes fully accounted for across 
the interconnection ‘B – C’.  As a result, the interconnection changes to a green unbroken line 
which indicates RES-E flow - meaning that the combination of imported and domestic RES-
E exceeds domestic load in Country B.  For this reason, this methodological approach 
employs an iterative approach to account for the numerous interconnection flows that occur 
in a meshed grid, such as the European electricity system represented in this paper by 58 




































































Step 3-6: Steps 3-6 are identical to Step 2, with each using the table from the previous step to 
identify the RES-E volume of imported electricity, i.e. increasing accuracy with each step.  
This methodology uses as many steps as necessary to account for all RES-E flows.  While 
comparing Step 5 to Step 6, the results for all 58 interconnectors across Europe over the year 
were identical, therefore Step 5 was the final iteration.
9
  These values account for renewable 
electricity flows all the way back to their source and provide an insight into the locations 
where RES-E is consumed on an hourly basis for the year 2030.  
3. Results 
This section presents results and analysis from the applied methodology and simulated 2030 
European model. 
3.1. Wholesale electricity prices 
Figure 3 demonstrates wholesale price differentials with 26 countries inside ±10% of the 
€73.21 per MWh average.  Low price differentials are observed due to the increased level of 
interconnection capacity expected in 2030.  The Czech Republic has the highest wholesale 
price of any electrically interconnected country simulated, it also experiences the highest 
level of interconnector congestion (55%) over the year.  This congestion is caused by 
physical transmission capacity constraints and directly contributes to price formation as lower 
cost electricity from surrounding countries cannot be imported at a sufficient rate to further 
suppress the marginal price.  
 
[INSERT Figure 3] 
 
3.2. RES-E interconnector flow 
The method ology outlined in Subsection 2.2 is applied to identify and also quantify the RES-
E contribution of electricity transfer between countries on a high temporal resolution.  Figure 
4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 show three insights to the findings from the post-processing phase.  
The figures outline the overall electricity flow and renewable electricity flow between 
countries along with the renewable share of the transferred electricity on an annualised basis. 
                                                 
9
 The number of steps may change depending on a number of variables, such as installed renewable generation 





































































[INSERT Figure 4] 
[INSERT Figure 5] 
[INSERT Figure 6] 
 
Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 highlight the unequal electricity transfer between a selection 
of countries over a year.  The figures also demonstrate the difference in RES-E share that is 
transferred over the same period.  However, it should be reiterated that both observations are 
contingent on assumptions surrounding generation portfolios and profiles used, demand 
curves, fuel costs, taxes, et cetera.  Figure 4 shows Portugal and Spain transferring a similar 
amount of total electricity back and forth over the year, yet 66% of exported electricity 
originating in Portugal is from renewable sources while only 2% of electricity returned is 
considered renewable.  Similarly, France exports high volumes of electricity to Spain but 
with no RES-E share, which is directly associated with its generation portfolio, i.e. high share 
of nuclear power.  This can also be seen in Figure 5 where France is a net exporter to 
Germany but, again, with no RES-E share.  Figure 5 further highlights the issue regarding 
RES-E share of imports-exports when analysing the interconnections between Germany-
Denmark and Germany-Poland where large differences between RES-E contributions are 
identified. Figure 6 is perhaps the most striking example to show the significance, where 
hydro based Norwegian power is exported to the Denmark and UK at 99% and 100% RES-E 
over the year respectively.  While Norway does not import significant quantities of electricity 
in the simulation, the volume that is imported has a much lower RES-E content.  Table 3 
demonstrates the net RES-E share transferred on each interconnector.  Remaining cognisant 
of the conservative assumptions surrounding scenario selection, the analysis carried out as 
part of this paper estimates that 60 TWh of renewable electricity is transferred across 
European interconnectors in 2030 or 19% of total cross-border flow. 
 





































































3.3. Country-specific renewable electricity shares 
Viewing renewable electricity in this alternative light opens ‘Pandora’s box’ in terms of 
accounting for the renewable electricity shares of each country.  Identifying where renewable 
electricity is produced, transferred to and finally, where it is consumed in high temporal 
resolution is an accurate means of assessing the share of the electricity sourced from 
renewable sources that is actually consumed within state.  Figure 7 compares RES-E shares 
of individual countries applying the current approach long used by the European Commission 
(RES-E production) to the alternative approach outlined in this paper that accounts for 
renewable electricity transfer across interconnectors (RES-E consumption). 
 
[INSERT Figure 7] 
 
Using the approach outlined in this paper, Figure 7 shows a higher number of countries with 
a different level of renewable electricity than what would otherwise be reported using the 
current production-based approach.  In reality when wind generation is high in the Nordics 
and hydro-power capacity in Norway is generating low-cost electricity, excess generation is 
exported out of the Nordic region.  While this electricity may be used elsewhere, it is still 
from a renewable energy source.  The same applies when solar capacity in the more southern, 
warmer parts of Europe is producing high levels of power and this is transferred to load 
centres across the wider region, and so on.  Applying the current approach used by the 
European Commission, while a simpler approach, does not account for this transfer.
10
  For 
example, Figure 7 demonstrates that, when taken on an annualised basis, Norway has excess 
renewable electricity which is transferred to surrounding countries to meet their demand (if 
the correct price signals are in place.)
11
  The traditional approach to quantifying RES-E does 
not capture this transfer or where RES-E is consumed and therefore could be seen as a poorer 
approach in calculating RES-E for adjoining countries.  Denmark and Sweden are examples 
that show the inability of the traditional approach to account for the level of renewable 
                                                 
10
 The authors recognise that ‘Statistical Transfers’ are allowed under the Renewable Energy Directive 
(2009/28/EC), however this option is yet to be availed of by any Member State, at time of writing. 
11
 This assumption is supported by evidence available from Eurostat, 2016. European Statistics. showing 




































































energy actually consumed within state – which in both cases is higher than otherwise would 
be reported, as shown in Figure 7. 
For simplicity, measuring RES-E production is an easier option.  However, as electricity 
markets across Europe become more intrinsically linked and transition toward a complete 
EU-wide internal market, the current approach may no longer be the correct strategy to 
capture where RES-E is consumed and importantly where it is paid for.  In Section 4 the case 
study results demonstrated thus far are expanded upon to discuss issues around cross-border 
subsidisation, price distortion and cost inequality. 
4. Discussion 
Section 3 results demonstrate the difference between a consumption and production-based 
approach to quantifying RES-E in Europe.  This section examines a number of considerations 
and impacts associated with the findings and discusses the possible consequences. 
4.1. What does a consumption-based approach offer? 
A consumption-based approach improves clarity, accuracy and awareness of where RES-E is 
produced and it is consumed.  The clarity of knowing where electricity is generated, how 
interconnector flows are determined and the effects of generation portfolios in neighbouring 
countries.  Improved accuracy through the accounting of imported renewable electricity 
generated outside of state boundaries yet consumed within, and the awareness of potential 
issues that can arise when the volume and scale of RES-E transfers across the region escalate.  
A consumption-based approach also sheds light on issues of price distortion (caused by 
uncoordinated support schemes) and cross-border subsidisation (creating cost inequality). 
4.2. Who pays the ‘true’ cost of transferred renewable electricity? 
The EU Target Model is designed to promote the free flow of electricity throughout Europe 
unaffected by network constraints or price distortions to achieve a price convergence across 
the region.  While Figure 3 shows the effects of this framework in terms of a relatively 
shallow price range, Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 reveal a different perspective on 
unconstrained electricity flow regarding renewable electricity transfer.  Acknowledging that 
significant volumes of RES-E capacity across Europe are supported outside of the energy 
market through support mechanisms, and yet interconnector flows are based on wholesale 
energy market prices, this creates a paradox.  As more RES-E capacity is installed, wholesale 




































































export at a price that is not truly reflective of the cost to generate the power being exported.  
Thereby leaving the country where the renewable electricity is produced to meet the 
stipulations of the support schemes in place, i.e. remunerate the RES-E capacity to the agreed 
terms and conditions while the energy is consumed outside of state borders. 
For instance, the simulation shows that the interconnection capacity from Denmark to 
Sweden exports (imports) approximately 1.8 (1.6) TWh over the year.  When Denmark 
exports to Sweden the electricity is 35% RES-E compared to 0.4% when flows reverse, as 
can be seen from Table 3.  Coupled with the examples shown in Figure 4, Figure 5 and 
Figure 6, this demonstrates that countries such as Denmark, Portugal, Norway and Germany 
for example are exposed to cost inequalities if 1) electricity is traded on interconnectors using 
its wholesale price (which it is and will continue to do so in line with the EU Target Model) 
and 2) RES-E capacity is supported outside of the energy market (which is currently the case 
in most European countries).  This longstanding concern around price distortion effects 
caused by pecuniary externalities is a well published topic, see (Buchan and Keay, 2016; 
Couture and Gagnon, 2010; Fouquet and Johansson, 2008; Glachant and Ruester, 2014; Gore 
et al., 2016; International Energy Agency, 2016a; Joskow, 2008; Lehmann and Gawel, 2013; 
Meyer and Gore, 2015; Roques, 2008).  Nevertheless, with large volumes of RES-E capacity 
required to achieve the future goal of a decarbonised power sector, this challenge may be 
amplified and become a more widespread problem noting that this paper demonstrates a 
conservative view of what may actually unfold in 2030 (Capros et al., 2016). 
Quantifying the financial implications for countries net-exporting RES-E is a challenging 
task as there has been little coordination between Member States when setting up RES-E 
support schemes across Europe over the years.
12
  Neighbouring countries may endure 
dissimilar levels of price distortion due to the differing support structures, remuneration 
levels and/or contract lengths.  Bearing in mind the current Member State specific RES-E 
targets for 2020, in simple terms this means if a country could not achieve the necessary 
uptake in RES-E capacity to meet national targets, the remuneration offered or scheme 
framework may be altered to increase its attractiveness through higher remuneration, longer 
                                                 
12
 While it must be recognised that the European Commission has used its “autonomous control power” 
regarding the policing of national state aids to shape support schemes in some way, as alluded to by Buchan and 
Keay (2016) and also having recently introduced a working document on guidance for the design of renewable 
support schemes European Commission, 2013. Guidance for the design of renewable support schemes - 
Commission staff working document. SWD(2013) 439 final. European Commission, Brussels., it is recognised 




































































contracts, or less risk-exposure.  Ireland for example, changed its RES-E support in 2007 
from a competitive bidding process to a centrally administered price setting scheme to 
increase profitability for RES-E generation capacity.  According to Global Wind Energy 
Council & International Renewable Energy Agency (2013), many projects awarded financial 
support through the competitive bidding process in Ireland had not been built due to “low 
bidding prices and lack of profitability” (p.100).
13
 In a similar vein to price distortions 
stemming from uncoordinated capacity mechanisms as discussed by Gaffney et al. (2017b); 
Glachant and Ruester (2014); Gore et al. (2016); Meyer and Gore (2015), uncoordinated 
RES-E support schemes may be viewed in the same light during the transition to a future 
regional market based on undistorted price signals.  However, equally as important is the 
need to implement a framework for remunerating renewable electricity transferred across 
boundaries that improves cost equality – paying the ‘true’ cost rather than market price. 
4.2.1. How to address price distortion 
Viewing these concerns in the correct context is essential; meaning that the issue is borne out 
of a requirement for cross-boundary interactions, therefore the solution must also be viewed 
in the same geographical context.  Introducing a coordinated approach to RES-E support 
schemes through a European agency could provide the solidarity needed for cost equality to 
thrive, and thereby maximising societal welfare for all European electricity consumers.  An 
agency appointed to administer the renewable electricity affairs of the region that takes 
cognisance of individual economic, societal, technical and environmental conditions to create 
a level playing field, free of price distortion created by differing support structures.  This may 
not be an excessively unrealistic proposal, instead it could be recognised as a new, or an 
expansion of an existing, department within the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) for example.  An agency which was created through the EU Third 
Energy Legislative Package (2009/72/EC) to ensure the smooth functioning of the internal 
energy market (European Commission, 2009b).
14
 
                                                 
13
 For more information on the development of wind power in Ireland and the entire Irish electricity system 
between 1916-2015, see Gaffney, F., Deane, J., Gallachóir, B.Ó., 2017a. A 100 year review of electricity policy 
in Ireland (1916–2015). Energy Policy 105, 67-79. 
14
 This may be a timely suggestion as there is currently a proposal to strengthen ACER’s powers and 
responsibilities included in the draft directive on the Internal Electricity Market European Commission, 2016b. 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal market for electricity, 




































































The chosen agency could also be responsible for accurately quantifying renewable electricity 
shares and remunerating producers from the country that consumed their electricity instead of 
where it has been produced – effectively socialising the cost of renewable electricity across 
state boundaries to improve cost equality during Europe’s transition to a decarbonised 
system.  This approach could be seen as a reform or even an evolution of the ‘statistical 
transfers’ permitted between Member States in Article 6 of the Renewable Energy Directive 
and Article 8 of the latest Renewable Energy Directive draft (European Commission, 2016a). 
Increasing the accuracy of cost distributions associated with the consumption of renewable 
electricity may also provide secondary gains.  Aside from reducing the level of revenue 
required to remunerate RES-E generation in an exporting country, this approach may lower 
the economic barriers surrounding the cost to consumers of developing higher levels of RES-
E capacity.  If, for example, a country has the correct topography and climate for hydro-
powered generation, then the cost as well as the benefit of this renewable energy source can 
be shared with neighbouring nations.  This may encourage further development in countries 
rich in potential renewable assets such as geothermal, solar, biomass, biogas, wave, tidal and 
wind energy by lowering the economic barriers which often add weight to institutional and 
organisational barriers as shown in publications by Byrnes et al. (2013); Foxon et al. (2005); 
Hvelplund et al. (2017); Lund et al. (2014); Lund and Quinlan (2014); Painuly (2001); Reddy 
and Painuly (2004); Scarpa and Willis (2010); Verbruggen et al. (2010).  
4.2.2. Is there appetite for change? 
Buchan and Keay (2016) highlight that the European Commission “has twice tried, and twice 
failed, to persuade EU governments to adopt a harmonised EU-wide subsidy system.” (p.7).  
Therefore, an appetite appears to exist at EU level. Furthermore, Article 5 of the latest 
Renewable Energy Directive draft the European Commission includes plans to open access 
for RES-E support schemes to installations located in other Member States (European 
Commission, 2016a).  However, legal conflicts such as the PreussenElekra case of 2001,
15
 or 
more recently the Ålands Vindkraft case in 2014,
16
 highlight the individual nature of EU 
Member States and the ‘parochial’ thinking that exists regarding environmental targets – 
albeit the very nature of individual targets encourages this behaviour.  
                                                 
15
 For more information, see: http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-379/98  
16




































































The issue, is perhaps best epitomised by the Ålands Vindkraft case, where a windfarm 
situated in the Åland archipelago of Finland applied for a Swedish RES-E support scheme as 
it was directly connected to the Swedish system but not that of Finland.  The application was 
rejected on the grounds that it was unfair for Swedish consumers to remunerate a wind farm 
contributing to Finland’s RES target.  Once this occurred, the boundaries of environmental 
protection were clearly drawn by Sweden, even in the face of breaching European energy 
market law surrounding the free movement of goods, i.e. electricity.  While the European 
Court of Justice required justification from Sweden regarding the case, the ruling was in 
Sweden’s favour as the argument was successfully made that the Renewable Energy 
Directive does permit the trans-boundary RES-E support schemes but does not require it 
(European Commission, 2009a).  Therefore, Sweden were found to have acted within the 
boundaries of EU law. 
Despite the European Court of Justice ruling, Durand and Keay (2014) believe that the 
Ålands Vindkraft case raises more questions than it answers regarding the relationship 
between environmental protection (and individual Member State targets) and its place within 
the European energy market law.  Durand and Keay (2014) highlight that other Member 
States have cited the Ålands Vindkraft case as a justification for discriminatory practices.  
Germany for example, cited the case while attempting to introduce a surcharge on imported 




While it is the opinion of Buchan and Keay (2016) that cross-border subsidy sharing may be 
a bridge too far at the time of publication, it must be seen as progressive that Norway and 
Sweden introduced a joint support scheme that includes an international agreement between 
the countries to recognised ‘green energy’ produced in another jurisdiction,
18
 or that the 
German-Danish cross-border solar photovoltaic electricity auction was launched in 2016 
(International Energy Agency, 2016b), or indeed, when the European Commission included 
plans supporting (and requiring) subsidy sharing in Article 5 of the latest Renewable Energy 
Directive draft (European Commission, 2016a).  Remaining cognisant that the ‘green energy 
contributions’ conversation regarding joint, cross-border schemes will be ‘null and void’ 
                                                 
17
 For more information, see: http://www.reuters.com/article/eu-energy-idUSL6N0PE24C20140703 and 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?num=T-47/15  
18
 The amount of ‘green energy’ contributed toward national RES targets would depend on the level of 




































































post-2020 once national RES targets are relinquished for 2030, issues surrounding cross-
border subsidisation of RES-E on a supranational scale will remain, and potentially increase 
due to heightened levels of both RES-E generation and installed interconnection capacity. 
4.3. Considerations associated with a consumption-based alternative approach 
Complexity, complexity, complexity. This proposal ensures much of it.  Calculating the 
locations where renewable electricity is generated, how much is transferred, where it actually 
consumed, et cetera, is all involved work.  Nevertheless, the alternative is to continue to use a 
methodology which may not be fit for purpose.  Increasing the installed capacity of different 
renewable energies both in Europe and globally adds to the already multifaceted world of the 
electricity sector.  As the penetration of renewable energies increase, as does the need for 
interconnection, support mechanisms, along with issues surrounding the ‘missing money’ 
problem, price distortions, and many more.  While this paper does not provide the solutions 
to all these issues, it may be seen in a similar light to that published by Ji et al. (2016) as a 
‘thought-provoker’, one that tries to unearth a different way of thinking about the future 
electricity sector.  
Further research is necessary in numerous areas to add layers to this proposal.  For instance; 
the identification of regulatory and institutional barriers is essential for any movement 
towards a new approach for calculating RES-E shares and establishing a framework around 
the cost inequality issue, identifying how to best approach this redistribution of costs are two 
important areas of research. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper proposes an alternative approach for quantifying the RES-E share of individual 
countries based on the volume consumed rather than produced to address potential 
inadequacies associated with the modern-day approach.  As global power sector portfolios 
are undergoing a technology transformation to achieve carbon-neutrality over the long-term, 
renewable generation is fundamental to the cause along with high levels of interconnection to 
help facilitate the transition and remain as part of the enduring solution.  
While increased interconnection capacity adds to the operational aspect of system control as 
non-synchronous RES-E can be safely and securely managed without curtailment being the 
first option, it also exacerbates an underlying issue with price distortions stemming from out-




































































exists: as renewable generation (receiving out-of-market support) increases, wholesale 
electricity prices decrease, becoming more attractive to export at a price that is not truly 
reflective of the cost to generate that power.  Consequently, this price distortion creates a cost 
inequality as consumers are left to remunerate the renewable electricity producer while the 
energy is consumed out of state. Using the EU Target Model as a case study, this paper 
provides an awareness to the potential volume and scale of the issue in a sector aiming for 
long-term de-carbonisation. The paper shows that even in a conservative 2030 scenario that 
significant volumes of renewable electricity is likely to be transferred on annual basis. This 
approach should not be considered exclusive for Europe, instead it could be thought of as 
being applicable to any region with a similar nexus between renewable electricity generation 
and interconnection to surrounding systems. 
This paper suggests that tackling price distortions associated with renewable generation 
support mechanisms may be best approached from a supranational perspective.  An agency, 
such as ACER within the EU, could provide the solidarity needed for cost equality to thrive, 
thereby maximising societal welfare for all electricity consumers in the region.  Appointed to 
administer the renewable electricity affairs of a region, this agency should take cognisance of 
individual economic, societal, technical and environmental conditions to create a level 
playing field, free of price distortion created by differing support structures.  An agency 
responsible for accurately quantifying renewable electricity shares and remunerating 
producers from the country that consumed their electricity instead of where it has been 
produced – effectively socialising the cost of renewable electricity across state boundaries to 
improve cost equalities during the transition to a decarbonised system.  
Increasing the accuracy of cost distributions associated with the consumption of renewable 
electricity may also provide secondary gains.  Aside from reducing the level of revenue 
required to remunerate RES-E generation in an exporting country, this approach may lower 
the economic barriers surrounding the cost to consumers of developing higher levels of RES-
E capacity.  If, for example, a country has the correct topography and climate for hydro-
powered generation, then the cost as well as the benefit of this renewable energy source can 
be shared with neighbouring nations – aligning with aspects present in the Renewable Energy 
Directive around subsidy sharing, joint projects and statistical transfers, improving 
investment signals and issues surrounding long-term security of electricity supply.  
The complexity associated with quantifying RES-E based on the proposed approach will be 




































































perceived as an increasingly inaccurate methodology. Measuring RES-E by production may 
be viewed as a ‘quick and easy’ approach, however as electricity markets worldwide become 
more intrinsically linked and transition toward a de-carbonised sector with high renewable 
generation capacity, simplicity may no longer be the correct strategy for reasons alluded to.  
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Table 1: The standardised generation characteristics applied
1
 
Fuel Type Capacity (MW) Start Cost (€) Min Stable Factor (%) 
Biomass/waste 300 10000 30 
Derived gas 150 12000 40 
Geothermal heat 70 3000 40 
Hydro (lakes) 150 0 0 
Hydro (run of river) 200 0 0 
Hydrogen 300 5000 40 
Natural gas CCGT 450 80000 40 
Natural gas OCGT 100 10000 20 
Nuclear 1200 120000 60 
Oil 400 75000 40 
Solids 300 80000 30 
Table 2: Fuel and carbon price assumptions 
Fuel Type / Carbon 2030 
Oil (€2010 per boe) €90 
Gas (€2010 per boe) €52 
Coal (€2010 per boe) €18 
Carbon - ETS (€2010 per Tonne) €40 
Table 3: Net renewable electricity flow transfer as a share of total electricity transfer
2
 
AI-GB AT-CZ AT-DE AT-HU AT-IT AT-SI BE-DE BE-FR BE-GB BE-LU 
46% 15% 12% 23% 25% 25% -10% 0% 0% -9% 
BE-NL BG-GR BG-RO CH-AT CH-DE CH-FR CH-IT CY-GR CZ-DE CZ-PL 
-1% -13% 0% -6% 6% 19% 24% 2% -2% 0% 
CZ-SK DE-DK DE-FR DE-LU DE-NL DE-PL DE-SE DK-GB DK-NL DK-NO 
0% -12% 10% 6% 10% 4% 9% 43% 37% -42% 
DK-SE EE-FI EE-LV ES-PT FI-SE FR-AI FR-ES FR-GB FR-IT FR-LU 
34% 0% -4% -64% 0% -18% -14% 0% -1% 0% 
GR-IT HU-HR HU-RO HU-SI HU-SK IT-SI LT-LV LT-PL LT-SE NL-GB 
20% -1% -1% -1% 0% -1% -3% 0% -1% 1% 
NO-DE NO-GB NO-NL NO-SE PL-SE PL-SK SI-HR    
79% 100% 98% 94% 0% 0% 0%    
 
                                                 
1
 Heat rates for the thermal categories represented in Table 1 are based on an individual country by country basis 
from the European Commission’s Reference Scenario 2016. 
2
 The table contains the electricity flows to and from the All-Island (AI) electricity system which consists of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland, along with Great Britain (GB). 
Table(s)




Figure 2: Illustrative example to explain the different steps undertaken 
 
                                                 
1
 Greece is also electrically connected to Cyprus. This interconnector is excluded from Figure 1 to maintain 
granularity around areas with the highest interconnection density. 
Figure(s)




                                                 
2
 Due to the aggregated nature of the generation portfolio, Malta experiences a non-optimal dispatch which 
results in numerous hours of negative pricing.  
Figure 4: Interconnection activity between Portugal, Spain and France 
 
Figure 5: Interconnection activity between France, Germany, Denmark and Poland 
 
Figure 6: Interconnection activity between Norway, Denmark and the United Kingdom 
 
Figure 7: Comparing the RES-E share of 30 countries applying the traditional approach (RES-E 





                                                 
3
 The simulation did not model generator “own use” or transmission and distribution losses, therefore Gross 
Final Consumption is unknown. In its place, the final electricity consumption is used to measure RES shares. 
For example, the RES-E Production is calculated using the renewable generation divided by the final electricity 
consumption of each country. RES-E Consumption uses the renewable generation plus renewable imports minus 
renewable export divided by final electricity consumption. It is recognised that this assumption is not aligned 
with the Renewable Energy Directive’s methodology, however it provides an insight into the relative difference 
between the two approach which is the main point of the figure. 
 Consumption-based methodology to quantify RES-E is presented 
 Consumption-based approach accounts for impact of RES-E imports & exports 
 International agency could implement approach to address price distortions 
 Policy is enhanced by enabling more equitable and optimal electricity decarbonisation 
 
*Highlights
